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WAN: Watermarking Attack Network
Seung-Hun Nam∗, Wonhyuk Ahn∗, In-Jae Yu, Seung-Min Mun, and Heung-Kyu Lee
Abstract—Multi-bit watermarking (MW) has been developed
to improve robustness against signal processing operations and
geometric distortions. To this end, several benchmark tools
that simulate possible attacks on images to test robustness are
available. However, limitations in these general attacks exist since
they cannot exploit specific characteristics of the targeted MW. In
addition, these attacks are usually devised without consideration
for visual quality, which rarely occurs in the real world. To
address these limitations, we propose a watermarking attack
network (WAN), a fully trainable watermarking benchmark tool,
that utilises the weak points of the target MW and removes
inserted watermark and inserts inverted bit information, thereby
considerably reducing watermark extractability. To hinder the
extraction of hidden information while ensuring high visual
quality, we utilise a residual dense blocks-based architecture
specialised in local and global feature learning. A novel water-
marking attack loss is introduced to break the MW systems. We
empirically demonstrate that the WAN can successfully fool a
variety of MW systems.
Index Terms—Watermarking attack, Multi-bit watermarking,
Convolutional neural network (CNN), Watermark bit inversion
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL watermarking is a technique used to protectcopyright by embedding identification information, re-
ferred to as watermark, into the original image [1], [2]. Unlike
visible watermarking, which inserts a watermark perceptible
by the human visual system (HVS), invisible watermarking
is an approach that embeds imperceptible watermarks. In
particular, multi-bit watermarking (MW), which is a represen-
tative example of invisible watermarking, has been actively
researched so that multi-bit information can be extracted from
the watermarked image [3], [4]. MW inserts watermarks by
considering the following fundamental requirements: Imper-
ceptibility, which is the degree of invisibility of a watermark in
the watermarked signal, and Robustness, which is the ability of
the watermark to survive against various watermarking attacks
[5].
Imperceptibility is assessed using image quality assess-
ment (IQA) metrics, which evaluate visual quality degrada-
tion caused by the embedding of the watermark. To assess
robustness, a benchmark tool composed of various attacks,
such as StirMark [6], [7] and CheckMark [8], is applied to a
watermarked image. These tools assess the robustness of the
watermarking system by how well the watermark information
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Fig. 1. How a watermarking attack network (WAN) works. The red arrow
denotes the case in which a message deformed by WAN is extracted; our work
can hinder the extraction of the watermark while maintaining visual quality.
survives after these simulated attacks. However, these tools
attack watermarked images in a general way without consid-
ering the context of the watermarking system, so they cannot
dig into the specific weak points of the watermarking system.
Moreover, these attacks degrade visual quality beyond what
is acceptable for commercial exploitation since they do not
consider the statistical properties of the watermarked signal
[9].
Instead, malicious users can design effective attacks to
remove the watermark by targeting the MW and without
visual degradation, which further deepens the gap between
attacks in the real-world and existing benchmark tools [1],
[5], [9]. In this case, the watermarking system designers can
assume a worst-case attack, where the watermark embedding
and extraction algorithms are public, to make systems more
robust against adversaries. In this context, designing novel
benchmark tools to create tests that are adequate for individual,
specific watermarking systems to induce the false extraction
of inserted information while maintaining a high quality level
for the content is important.
Motivated by the need for a useful tool to model and
understand the watermarking process, we propose a water-
marking attack network (WAN) that exploits the weak points
of individual watermarking systems without compromising
visual quality. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the proposed WAN
is devised to hinder the extraction of inserted watermarks by
adding interference signals to mislead the watermarking ex-
tractor. With proposed loss function, our work can both induce
abnormal extraction and generate a reconstructed image with a
visual quality similar to the original content. We determine that
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TABLE I
CATEGORIZATION OF MULTI-BIT WATERMARKING METHODS BASED ON THE WATERMARKING DOMAINS AND EMBEDDING ALGORITHMS
Category Attribute
Watermarking domain Discrete cosine transform (DCT), discrete wavelet transform (DWT), nonsubsampled contourlet transform (NSCT)dual-tree complex wavelet transform (DTCWT), singular value decomposition (SVD), QR decomposition (QRD)
Embedding algorithm Spread spectrum (SS), improved spread spectrum (ISS), quantization (QT),embedding for causing differences between sub-groups (DIF)
the residual dense block-based architectures ability to learn
local and global features is suitable for analysing each MW
method composed of various procedures and detailed attributes
such as the watermarking domains and embedding algorithms
[10]. The main contributions are listed as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
to successfully introduce a convolutional neural network
(CNN)-based deep learning framework for watermarking
attack.
• Compared to existing benchmark tools [6], [7], the WAN
with the proposed loss terms and network architecture
is suitable for learning low-level features and induces
abnormal watermark extraction while maintaining the
inherent content of a given image. We experimentally
demonstrate that our proposed WAN can successfully
attack variety of watermarking systems [11]–[16] in terms
of the watermarking domains and embedding algorithms
while conserving image quality.
• For specific MW methods, it was confirmed that the WAN
can apply subtle modification to induce the watermark bit
embedded in the image to be extracted in an inverted state
(e.g., 0→ 1 or 1→ 0).
II. RELATED WORKS
We propose a new watermarking attack that targets inter-
fering of watermark extraction regardless of MW methods. In
this section, we review previous works related to our work.
A. Multi-bit Watermarking (MW)
Rather than using zero-bit watermarking to detect the pres-
ence or the absence of a watermark, MW can be used in var-
ious applications since the n-bit-long message (m = {0, 1}n)
can be inserted in the host image Io to get a watermarked
image Iw [17]. For watermarking, the transform domain such
as DWT [14], DTCWT [12], DCT [11], [13], [15], NSCT
[18], SVD [19], and QRD [16] to be inserted is determined,
and then watermark embedding is performed by applying an
embedding algorithm such as SS [2], [5], ISS [20], QT [21],
[22], and DIF [14], [15] to the selected domain (see Table I). In
consideration of imperceptibility and robustness, MW methods
select a watermarking domain and an embedding algorithm,
and complex procedures such as perceptual masking [2] and
template insertion [13] are added.
The block-based approach [11]–[16], which inserts a wa-
termark bit (0 or 1) in each subblock, is mainly used for
multi-bit information insertion rather than the keypoint-based
approach [4] due to the benefits that can be achieved by
utilising the entire domain. In the extraction phase, message
mˆ can be extracted from Iw in a blind fashion where the
original image or any side information is not required [17]. The
performance of MW is evaluated in terms of imperceptibility
and robustness. Specifically, the visual differences between Io
and Iw are determined using the IQA metrics, such as peak
signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and structural similarity (SSIM)
[23], and robustness is evaluated by calculating bit error rate
(BER) between m and mˆ.
B. Watermarking Attack and Motivation
Watermarking attacks are employed to evaluate the ro-
bustness of MW methods; let Aw be the attacked image
of Iw. By comparing the messages extracted from Iw and
Aw, a MW designer can evaluate the robustness of the
MW by determining whether the hidden information survived
[9]. Currently, StirMark [6], [7] and CheckMark [8] are the
representative benchmark tools that provide various types of
common attacks such as signal processing operations and
geometric distortions. As can be seen in Fig. 2, common
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Fig. 2. Examples of the results of conducting watermarking attacks using StirMark and the proposed WAN. The first row shows the visual quality of the
attacked images, and the second row shows the residual images between the watermarked and attacked images.
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Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of the network architecture of our WAN framework.
watermarking attacks mounted in StirMark are accompanied
by visual degradation and have a limitation of not being able
to model the vulnerabilities of each MW method. That is, the
more that a watermarking attack utilises the characteristics of
the targeted watermarking system, the more effective the attack
is possible without image quality degradations.
With the development of neural networks, CNN-based MW
methods [24], [25] have been newly proposed, and they can
be neutralised with adversarial attacks [26] attempting to
fool watermarking systems through malicious inputs; these
are referred to as adversarial examples. However, numerous
non-learning-based approaches proposed before deep learning
evolved cannot be attacked by an adversarial attack and require
a new type of watermarking attack approach. To address
these issues, a watermarking attack that exploits the weak
points of individual watermarking systems of non-learning-
based approaches are proposed only when tripled images, Io,
watermarked images with bit 0 Iw0 , and watermarked images
with bit 1 Iw1 , are given.
III. WATERMARKING ATTACK NETWORK (WAN)
Our proposed WAN is summarised in Fig. 3. Our system
targets block-based MW and needs one triple set of sub-
block image patches, of Io, Iw0 , and Iw1 . WAN takes Iw0
and Iw1 as inputs and reconstructs each of them into attacked
images Aw0 and Aw1 , respectively. Our goal is to reconstruct
images that mislead the watermarking extractor to decide
on the wrong bit. In other words, when Aw0 and Aw1 are
considered to have been inserted 1 bit and 0 bit, we judge
the attack to be successfully done. On the other hand, the
attacked image should be similar to the original to minimise
visual degradation. We start with in-depth descriptions of loss
functions consisting of watermarking attack loss and content
loss and provide detailed descriptions of the architecture of
the network and the mini-batch configuration.
A. Loss Function
Our goal is to hinder the watermark extraction for the target
MW system. Watermarked images are reconstructed to be
reverse bit inserted with following original content to minimise
visual quality degradation. To achieve both, we propose a
customised loss as an objective function to train the WAN
as follows:
L = λwaLwa + λcLc, (1)
where Lwa and Lc represent watermarking attack loss, which
is devised to change an inserted bit and content loss to
minimise visual degradation, respectively. λwa and λc indicate
predefined weight terms for each loss. In the following, we
describe each of the proposed losses in detail.
1) Watermarking Attack Loss: Existing watermarking
methods vary in terms of the watermarking domains and
embedding algorithms, so it is difficult to theoretically model
MW in a single system. Moreover, conventional MW methods
incorporate non-differentiable operations, so it is difficult for
the neural network to learn directly from these methods even
though step-by-step instructions are publicly available. We
simplify this problem as the watermarking signal is added to
the original image in the pixel domain, and focus on the noise
patterns that are decided by bit information. In other words, the
residual signal arose by bit 0 insertion Ro,w0 = |Io−Iw0 | and
the residual signal arisen by bit 1 insertion Ro,w1 = |Io−Iw1 |,
which can be identified by neural networks. We hypothesise
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that the neural network can remove watermarking signals in
images and insert opposite noise patterns, which causes wrong
bit extraction at the watermarking extractor. In this case, the
attacked image Aw0 on Iw0 would have similar noise pattern
R˜o,w0 = |Io − Aw0 | to Ro,w1 , for which the one with bit 0
makes. The noise pattern R˜o,w1 of the attacked image Aw1 on
Iw1 would be similar to Ro,w0 , in the same way.
To capture the above observation, watermarking attack loss
for the image of size W ×H , Lwa is defined as follows
Lwa = 1
N
N∑
i=1
|Rio,w0− R˜io,w1 |+
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Rio,w1− R˜io,w0 |, (2)
where superscript i refers to pixel location and N =W ×H .
The first term of Equation 2 is for deriving the watermark bit
1 inserted in Iw1 into 0, and the second term is for deriving
bit 0 inserted in Iw0 into bit 1. As depicted in Fig. 3, a loss
is designed by pairing the residual images before and after
going through the WAN according to the inserted bit and
reducing the difference between the paired images. Through
the Lwa, it is possible to add a fine noise-like attack that
inverts the actually inserted bit during the process of passing
the watermarked images over the WAN.
2) Content Loss: In our work, it is important to proceed
with the attack while maintaining the visual quality of the
given content. To this end, content loss is adopted to reduce
the visual differences between the original content Io and its
corresponding reconstructed images, including Aw0 and Aw1
attacked by the WAN (see Fig. 3). Inspired by the papers [27],
[28] demonstrating that `1 loss can bring better visual quality
than `2 loss for general restoration tasks, the content loss of
Lc is defined as follows
Lc = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1∑
j=0
|Iio −Aiwj |. (3)
From Lc, it is possible to conduct a watermarking attack while
minimising visual quality degradations in the original content.
Through the final objective function of L combined with Lc
and Lwa, the proposed WAN can reconstruct images in a way
that adversely affects the extraction of the inserted bit while
maintaining the inherent properties of the original content.
B. Model Architecture
Fig. 3 illustrates the neural network architecture for our
model. We follow the network design from the residual dense
network (RDN) [10] that is used for the learning of the
local and global features and the ability of image restoration.
The residual dense block (RDB) constituting the RDN is
composed of densely connected convolutional (Conv) layers
and is specialised in extracting abundant local features. In
our work, a dilated Conv-based dense block (DRDB) with
a dilated Conv layer applied to the RDB is utilised, and the
DRDB is placed in the deeper layer to increase the receptive
field. In the proposed WAN, the pooling layer and up-sampling
are excluded, so the input and output sizes are the same
({Iw0 , Iw1 , Aw0 , Aw1} ∈ Z1×W×H). The first and second
Conv layers are placed to extract shallow features and conduct
global residual learning. Next, by placing RDBs in a shallow
layer and subsequent DRDBs in a deeper layer, the local
features is learned, and the receptive field increased as the
layer deepened. We expect sub-components for local residual
learning and local feature fusion commonly used in RDB and
DRDB to help our model learn low-level features caused by
watermark embedding. After that, by the concatenation layer
followed by 1× 1 and 3× 3 Conv layers, dense local features
extracted from the set of RDBs and DRDBs are fused in a
global way. The deep part of the proposed WAN is composed
for global residual learning based on shallow feature maps.
C. Mini-batch Configuration
Since invisible MW is the approach of inserting a watermark
so that it is unnoticeable by HVS, mini-batch configuration
suitable for fine signal learning is required instead of the
standard mini-batch used in high-level computer vision. The
authors in [29] presented paired mini-batch training, which
is efficient for learning low-level features such as multimedia
forensics [30], [31] and steganalysis. To aid in learning the
discriminative features between watermarked results more
effectively, paired mini-batch training is utilised in our task.
That is, Iw0 and Iw1 generated for the same original image
Io are allocated in a single batch, which allows the proposed
WAN to learn fine signals due to the differences in the fine
signals caused by the watermark bit. In detail, when the batch
size is bs, bs2 Iw0 images are selected first, and then
bs
2 Iw1
images corresponding to Iw0 are assigned to be in the same
batch. The entire dataset is shuffled every epoch.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We use IQA metrics, PSNR (dB) and SSIM to determine
imperceptibility and BER to evaluate attacks to get quantitative
results. Next, to show the superiority of our work compared
to StirMark [6], [7], we perform qualitative evaluations.
A. Experimental Setup
1) Datasets: BOSSbase [32] and BOWS [33] datasets are
used to generate 20,000 original grey-scale images with a size
of 512× 512. We resize them to 64× 64 (i.e., W = H = 64)
using the default settings in MATLAB R2018a, the resized
images are divided into three sets for training, validation,
and testing (with a 14 : 1 : 5 ratio). The block-based MW
methods [11]–[16] are used to generate watermarked images,
and the images are generated by embedding watermark bits
(0 or 1) into the original images given for each method listed
in Table II. These methods perform watermark bit extraction
in blind fashion, and NSCT-QT indicates that the QT-based
embedding algorithm in [22] is applied to the NSCT domain
[18]. The detailed parameters for the watermark embedding
and extraction of each MW method will be provided online
later. For further quantitative and qualitative evaluation, we
additionally generate test images sized 128×128 for the testing
set. Watermarked images with resolutions of 128 × 128 have
a watermark capacity of 4 bits. In the experiment, the WAN-
based attacks and watermark bit extraction proceeds for each
64× 64 patch.
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TABLE II
QUALITATIVE EVALUATION RESULTS ON TESTING SET WITH 1 BIT OF WATERMARK CAPACITY
Multi-bit watermarking system Non-attack WAN
Method WD EA Capacity Size of subdivision PSNR SSIM BER PSNR SSIM BER
Kim et al. [13] DCT SS 1 bit 1× 64 35.55 0.938 0.026 34.04 0.956 0.893
Lin et al. [11] DCT ISS 1 bit 8× 8 36.36 0.973 0 32.96 0.961 1.000
Lin et al. [11] DCT ISS 1 bit 16× 16 41.86 0.988 0 37.47 0.979 0.996
Parah et al. [15] DCT DIF 1 bit 8× 8 36.43 0.945 0 38.62 0.980 0.848
Su et al. [16] QR DIF 1 bit 8× 8 36.59 0.974 0 33.05 0.96 1.000
Makbol et al. [14] DWT, SVD DIF 1 bit 8× 8 38.98 0.986 0.002 37.70 0.985 0.988
Makbol et al. [14] DWT, SVD DIF 1 bit 16× 16 40.59 0.986 0.001 38.79 0.986 0.985
Kim et al. [12] DTCWT QT 1 bit - 36.61 0.972 0.021 35.52 0.972 0.622
NSCT-QT [18], [22] NSCT QT 1 bit - 39.21 0.987 0.013 36.54 0.980 0.946
Average - 38.02 0.972 0.007 36.08 0.973 0.920
∗ Notes: WD and EA represent abbreviation of the watermarking domain and the embedding algorithm, respectively.
TABLE III
QUALITATIVE EVALUATION RESULTS ON TESTING SET WITH 4 BITS OF WATERMARK CAPACITY
Multi-bit watermarking system Non-attack WAN
Method WD EA Capacity Size of subdivision PSNR SSIM BER PSNR SSIM BER
Kim et al. [13] DCT SS 4 bit 1× 64 35.53 0.938 0.049 34.79 0.963 0.905
Lin et al. [11] DCT ISS 4 bit 8× 8 37.54 0.974 0 33.77 0.966 0.999
Lin et al. [11] DCT ISS 4 bit 16× 16 42.62 0.987 0 37.44 0.980 0.993
Parah et al. [15] DCT DIF 4 bit 8× 8 36.41 0.928 0 39.82 0.987 0.752
Su et al. [16] QR DIF 4 bit 8× 8 37.55 0.973 0 33.64 0.962 0.998
Makbol et al. [14] DWT, SVD DIF 4 bit 8× 8 39.71 0.985 0.002 38.09 0.985 0.990
Makbol et al. [14] DWT, SVD DIF 4 bit 16× 16 40.68 0.981 0.001 38.51 0.981 0.987
Kim et al. [12] DTCWT QT 4 bit - 37.52 0.973 0.044 35.85 0.975 0.681
NSCT-QT [18], [22] NSCT QT 4 bit - 40.64 0.987 0.041 37.22 0.982 0.885
Average - 38.69 0.970 0.015 36.57 0.976 0.910
2) Implementation Details: We construct our model based
on the CNN components shown in Fig. 3. In detail, the number
of RDB, DRDB, Conv layer per RDB and DRDB, feature-
maps, and the growth rate are set to 6, 6, 6, 32, and 16,
respectively. For the 3× 3 dilated Conv layer, we use dilation
set to 1 and set the padding and stride to 2.
3) Training Settings: We build our network using PyTorch
and run the experiments on NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080
Ti. In the experiments, we use the Adam optimizer with a
learning rate of 10−4 and momentum coefficients β1 = 0.9,
β2 = 0.999. The size of mini-batch bs is set to 32, and
each mini-batch is configured for paired mini-batch training
[29]. The proposed WAN is trained with the hyperparameters
λc = 0.4 and λwa = 0.3 during 30 epochs, and the best model
is selected as the one that maximises BER on the validation
set for each MW method.
B. Quantitative Evaluation
In this subsection, quantitative evaluation of the WAN is
conducted in terms of bit extraction interference and visual
quality of reconstructed attacked images. Table II shows the
performance results of our work on testing set with 1 bit
capacity, which is generated through each MW method, which
are composed of various attributes. In non-attack situations,
each method has a low BER value of 0.026 or less, while the
average BER value increases dramatically to 0.920 after WAN
is applied. In particular, for MW methods in [11], [14], [16],
the BER value of methods rise to 0.985 or more, which means
that the WAN has learned a fine signal generated during the
watermark embedding and successfully performs bit inversion.
In case of [15] and [12], they have lower BER values of
0.848 and 0.622, respectively, and we expect this to be an
issue because these methods are composed of operations that
are hard to model and attack through the WAN. In general,
making the extraction performance at a random guessing level
is considered a very fatal attack [17], and it is validated that
the proposed Lwa successfully leads to abnormal extraction
of watermark bits.
In addition, minimizing the visual damage caused by water-
marking attacks is an important issue in our work. To do this,
we introduce Lc, and the gain of visual quality obtained from
the loss can be analyzed through PSNR and SSIM values with
Io in Table II. The average PSNR and SSIM values in non-
attack situation are 38.02 dB and 0.972, respectively. After
the WAN is applied, average PSNR decreases by 1.94 dB,
and SSIM remained similar to that before the attack. The
existing attacks [6]–[8] are not designed considering the visual
property of content, so it is accompanied by visual degradation
during the attack process. Meanwhile, our model based on Lc
is capable of inducing the drastic reversal of the watermark
bit with acceptable small loss of image quality.
We further conduct the experiments by applying the trained
WAN model with stride 64 to a testing set with 4 bits of
watermark capacity. As shown in Table III, the average PSNR,
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Fig. 5. Comparison of visual quality of the WAN and numerous attacks in StirMark.
SSIM and BER values for attacked images over the WAN are
36.57 dB, 0.976, and 0.910, respectively. Compared with the
results in Table II, we confirm that the overall performance
of the WAN is maintained even when the watermark capacity
is increased. For some MW methods [12], [15], [18], there
is an improvement and degradation in performance, which
is presumed to be caused by the dependence of each MW
on the inherent texture and content characteristics of given
images. Overall, the results of quantitative evaluation show
that the proposed WAN is suitable for testing MW methods
as a benchmark tool in terms of interference of watermark
extraction, maintenance of visual quality, and scalability ac-
cording to watermark capacity.
C. Qualitative Evaluation
Fig. 4 shows the examples of the watermarked image with
4 bit of capacity and the attacked image of the proposed
WAN. As shown in the top row of Fig. 4, the types of low-
level distortion caused by watermark embedding vary by MW
method while having similar high-level features (i.e., inherent
content of Io). The proposed WAN with Lwa and Lc can
hinder watermark extraction by learning these fine feature and
induces the attacked image to visually follow the original
content. Our work can produce natural attacked results that
very similar to images in non-attack situations (see bottom
row of Fig. 4).
Fig. 5 compares results of the our model and StirMark
[6], [7], representative benchmark tool, consisting signal pro-
cessing operations and geometric distortions. For fairness in
comparison, attacked images generated through attack param-
eters of StirMark that cause random guessing of bit extraction
(e.g., BER = 0.5) are compared. As mentioned above, the
StirMark is not an approach of attacking by modeling the
vulnerability of the MW method or considering inherent
content, so it is accompanied by unwanted visual degradation
in the attack process (see magnified sub-figures in Fig. 5). In
contrast, our WAN can adversely affect the extraction of the
inserted bit while maintaining the inherent properties of the
original content. From the results of qualitative evaluation, it
is confirmed that the CNN architecture specialized for image
restoration and the proposed loss function are effective in
generating natural attacked images.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel CNN-based benchmark
tool for block-based MW methods that learns the weak points
of the targeted watermarking approach and attacks water-
marked images to mislead the watermarking extractor with
minimal visual degradation. To achieve this goal, we design
customized losses of a watermarking attack loss for abnormal
bit extraction and a content loss to maintain visual quality. A
network architecture utilising RDB and DRDB is adopted as a
baseline that specialises in learning local and global features.
Through quantitative and qualitative experiments with a vari-
ety of MW methods, we demonstrate that the proposed WAN
performs more effective attacks than existing benchmark tools
in terms of maintaining visual quality and interfering with
watermark extraction. We expect that the proposed WAN will
be helpful for watermarking designers to test the robustness of
their MW methods. In future works, we will use the proposed
WAN to attack a wider range of watermarking systems in
terms of watermarking domains and embedding algorithms. In
addition, approaches to various attack scenarios not covered
in this paper will be studied.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Cox, M. Miller, J. Bloom, J. Fridrich, and T. Kalker, Digital water-
marking and steganography. Morgan kaufmann, 2007.
[2] M. Barni, F. Bartolini, V. Cappellini, and A. Piva, “A dct-domain system
for robust image watermarking,” Signal processing, vol. 66, no. 3, pp.
357–372, 1998.
[3] L. Pe´rez-Freire and F. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, “Spread-spectrum watermarking
security,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 2–24, 2009.
[4] S.-H. Nam, W.-H. Kim, S.-M. Mun, J.-U. Hou, S. Choi, and H.-K.
Lee, “A sift features based blind watermarking for dibr 3d images,”
Multimedia Tools and Applications, pp. 1–40, 2017.
[5] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, F. T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon, “Secure spread
spectrum watermarking for multimedia,” IEEE transactions on image
processing, vol. 6, no. 12, pp. 1673–1687, 1997.
[6] F. A. Petitcolas, R. J. Anderson, and M. G. Kuhn, “Attacks on copyright
marking systems,” in International workshop on information hiding.
Springer, 1998, pp. 218–238.
[7] F. A. Petitcolas, “Watermarking schemes evaluation,” IEEE signal pro-
cessing magazine, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 58–64, 2000.
[8] S. Pereira, S. Voloshynovskiy, M. Madueno, S. Marchand-Maillet, and
T. Pun, “Second generation benchmarking and application oriented
evaluation,” in International workshop on information hiding. Springer,
2001, pp. 340–353.
[9] S. Voloshynovskiy, S. Pereira, V. Iquise, and T. Pun, “Attack modelling:
towards a second generation watermarking benchmark,” Signal process-
ing, vol. 81, no. 6, pp. 1177–1214, 2001.
[10] Y. Zhang, Y. Tian, Y. Kong, B. Zhong, and Y. Fu, “Residual dense net-
work for image super-resolution,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference
on computer vision and pattern recognition, 2018, pp. 2472–2481.
[11] Y.-H. Lin and J.-L. Wu, “A digital blind watermarking for depth-
image-based rendering 3d images,” Broadcasting, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 602–611, June 2011.
[12] H.-D. Kim, J.-W. Lee, T.-W. Oh, and H.-K. Lee, “Robust dt-cwt
watermarking for dibr 3d images,” Broadcasting, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 533–543, Dec 2012.
[13] W.-H. Kim, J.-U. Hou, H.-U. Jang, and H.-K. Lee, “Robust template-
based watermarking for dibr 3d images,” Applied Sciences, vol. 8, no. 6,
2018.
[14] N. M. Makbol, B. E. Khoo, and T. H. Rassem, “Block-based discrete
wavelet transform-singular value decomposition image watermarking
scheme using human visual system characteristics,” IET Image Process-
ing, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 34–52, 2016.
[15] S. A. Parah, J. A. Sheikh, N. A. Loan, and G. M. Bhat, “Robust and
blind watermarking technique in dct domain using inter-block coefficient
differencing,” Digital Signal Processing, vol. 53, pp. 11–24, 2016.
[16] Q. Su, G. Wang, X. Zhang, G. Lv, and B. Chen, “An improved color
image watermarking algorithm based on qr decomposition,” Multimedia
Tools and Applications, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 707–729, 2017.
[17] A. Tefas, N. Nikolaidis, and I. Pitas, “Watermarking techniques for
image authentication and copyright protection,” in Handbook of Image
and Video Processing. Elsevier, 2005, pp. 1083–1109.
[18] A. L. Da Cunha, J. Zhou, and M. N. Do, “The nonsubsampled contourlet
transform: theory, design, and applications,” IEEE transactions on image
processing, vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 3089–3101, 2006.
[19] G. H. Golub and C. Reinsch, “Singular value decomposition and least
squares solutions,” in Linear Algebra. Springer, 1971, pp. 134–151.
[20] H. S. Malvar and D. A. Floreˆncio, “Improved spread spectrum: A new
modulation technique for robust watermarking,” IEEE transactions on
signal processing, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 898–905, 2003.
[21] D. Kundur and D. Hatzinakos, “Digital watermarking using multires-
olution wavelet decomposition,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Pro-
cessing, 1998. Proceedings of the 1998 IEEE International Conference
on, vol. 5. IEEE, 1998, pp. 2969–2972.
[22] S.-H. Wang and Y.-P. Lin, “Wavelet tree quantization for copyright
protection watermarking,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing,
vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 154–165, 2004.
[23] Z. Wang, A. C. Bovik, H. R. Sheikh, and E. P. Simoncelli, “Image
quality assessment: from error visibility to structural similarity,” IEEE
transactions on image processing, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 600–612, 2004.
[24] S.-M. Mun, S.-H. Nam, H.-U. Jang, D. Kim, and H.-K. Lee, “A robust
blind watermarking using convolutional neural network,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.03248, 2017.
[25] S.-M. Mun, S.-H. Nam, H. Jang, D. Kim, and H.-K. Lee, “Finding robust
domain from attacks: A learning framework for blind watermarking,”
Neurocomputing, vol. 337, pp. 191–202, 2019.
[26] B. Wen and S. Aydore, “Romark: A robust watermarking system using
adversarial training,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.01221, 2019.
[27] D. Kim, H.-U. Jang, S.-M. Mun, S. Choi, and H.-K. Lee, “Median
filtered image restoration and anti-forensics using adversarial networks,”
IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 278–282, 2017.
[28] H. Zhao, O. Gallo, I. Frosio, and J. Kautz, “Loss functions for image
restoration with neural networks,” IEEE Transactions on computational
imaging, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 47–57, 2016.
[29] J.-S. Park, H.-G. Kim, D.-G. Kim, I.-J. Yu, and H.-K. Lee, “Paired
mini-batch training: A new deep network training for image forensics
and steganalysis,” Signal Processing: Image Communication, vol. 67,
pp. 132–139, 2018.
[30] S.-H. Nam, W. Ahn, S.-M. Mun, J. Park, D. Kim, I.-J. Yu, and H.-K. Lee,
“Content-aware image resizing detection using deep neural network,”
in 2019 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP).
IEEE, 2019, pp. 106–110.
[31] S.-H. Nam, J. Park, D. Kim, I.-J. Yu, T.-Y. Kim, and H.-K. Lee, “Two-
stream network for detecting double compression of h. 264 videos,”
in 2019 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP).
IEEE, 2019, pp. 111–115.
[32] P. Bas, T. Filler, and T. Pevny`, “Break our steganographic system: the ins
and outs of organizing boss,” in International workshop on information
hiding. Springer, 2011, pp. 59–70.
[33] P. Bas and T. Furon, “Bows-2,” 2007.
